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EQUAL  ACCESS  IN  CYBERSPACE:
ON  BRIDGING  THE  DIGITAL  DIVIDE  IN
PUBLIC  ACCOMMODATIONS  COVERAGE
THROUGH  AMENDMENT  TO  THE
AMERICANS  WITH  DISABILITIES  ACT
Laura Wolk*
INTRODUCTION
At its signing, George H.W. Bush described the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (“ADA” or “the Act”) as “the world’s first comprehensive declaration
of equality for people with disabilities.”1  Invoking “the sweep of congres-
sional authority” under the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment,2
the Act purported to provide a “clear and comprehensive national mandate”3
for the elimination of discrimination against the disabled in principal areas
of American life including employment,4 state and local governmental ser-
vices and programs,5 and “place[s] of public accommodation.”6
In the twenty-five years since its passage, public and private officials have
engaged in vigorous discussion concerning what activities the ADA does and
does not cover.  This Note seeks to settle one such debate by ascertaining
whether private, commercial websites with no brick-and-mortar presence in
the physical world fall within Title III’s prohibition against disability-based
discrimination in places of public accommodation.7
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2016; B.A., Psychology,
Swarthmore College, 2009.  I would like to express my deepest and most sincere gratitude
to Dwight King and Beth Klein, without whose generosity and support I could not have
undertaken the writing of this Note.  My thanks also extend to Professor Randy Kozel for
his instructive comments and suggestions, Professors A.J. Bellia and O. Carter Snead for
their assistance, and Francesca Genova for her invaluable friendship and willingness to
lend her ears and eyes to this project.  All errors are mine.
1 President George H.W. Bush, Remarks on Signing of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 2 Pub. Papers 1068 (July 26, 1990).
2 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2012).
3 Id. § 12101(b)(1).
4 Id. § 12112(a).
5 Id. § 12132.
6 Id. § 12182(a).
7 Id.
447
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Thus far, those seeking to answer this question have fallen into one of
two camps.  Proponents for inclusion invoke the broad remedial purpose of
the statute, snippets from its legislative history, and public policy concerns to
advance their position.8  Those opposed to the expansive interpretation cite
canons of statutory construction,9 concerns over the use of legislative history,
and wariness of judicial activism10 to advance their position.  This Note
argues that, framed in this manner, the debate myopically focuses on one
purpose of the ADA—its “remedial” purpose—which “invoke[s] the sweep of
congressional authority . . . to address the major areas of discrimination faced
day-to-day by people with disabilities.”11  This goal is unquestionably instru-
mental to the ADA; the Act accomplishes it by expressly identifying the
numerous discriminatory actions rendered unlawful by the statute.  However,
the ADA does more than create a bare-bones outline of discriminatory
actions, leaving the responsibility of fleshing out the details to the designated
administrative agency.  Rather, via its equally important “standards” purpose,
the Act provides a corresponding set of clear, consistent, and enforceable
standards for each form of proscribed discrimination.12  Therefore, the Note
will argue that a proper interpretation of public accommodations coverage
requires consideration of the term in light of both statutory purposes.  This
approach will help to determine not only whether the term “public accom-
modation” is capacious enough to encapsulate websites, but also whether the
ADA explicitly provides a corresponding set of standards governing website-
based discrimination.
To this end, the Note will proceed in three Parts.  Part I will trace the
development of the case law on this issue, which has culminated in a circuit
split.  It will also discuss the influence of the Department of Justice (DOJ),
which has not exercised its regulatory authority on the subject but which has
8 See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, WHEN THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
GOES ONLINE: APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TO THE INTERNET AND
THE WORLDWIDE WEB 1 (2003) [hereinafter ADA GOES ONLINE], http://www.ncd.gov/
rawmedia_repository/960de0db_0548_4c4c_b000_6f1eabb0f84a.pdf; Matthew A. Stowe,
Interpreting “Place of Public Accommodation” Under Title III of the ADA: A Technical Determination
with Potentially Broad Civil Rights Implications, 50 DUKE L.J. 297, 323–25 (2000); Justin D.
Petruzzelli, Note, Adjust Your Font Size: Websites are Public Accommodations Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 1063, 1066, 1082–83 (2001).
9 See Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying the
noscitur a sociis canon); Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1318
(S.D. Fla. 2002) (applying the ejusdem generis canon); Patrick Maroney, Note, The Wrong
Tool for the Right Job: Are Commercial Websites Places of Public Accommodation Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990?, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 191, 192 (2000).
10 See, e.g., Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (arguing that giving the provision a
broad sweep would be intruding into Congress’s territory).
11 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).
12 Id. § 12101(b)(2).  The ADA’s third purpose of heavily involving the federal govern-
ment, id. § 12101(b)(3), is not applicable here.  Its fourth purpose, to provide a “clear and
comprehensive national mandate” for the eradication of disability-based discrimination, id.
§ 12101(b)(1), applies equally to the broad remedial and standards purposes discussed in
this Note.
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initiated enforcement actions consistent with an interpretation that includes
freestanding websites.  Part II will argue, based on the text, congressional
silence, and the statute’s dual principal purposes, that private commercial
websites do not fall within the purview of Title III.  Part III will propose that
disability rights advocates should direct their energy not toward enforcing
the statute as currently interpreted by the DOJ, but instead toward Congress
to ensconce this important public policy through clear statutory amend-
ments.  Such amendments should govern websites and establish a framework
for assessing and evaluating any technologies which might arise in the future.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: THE PUSH TOWARD INCLUDING WEBSITES AS
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
In theory, the proliferation of commercial websites has the potential to
markedly improve the disabled community’s ability to participate in commer-
cial activity.  Such individuals might otherwise find themselves barred by
insurmountable physical accessibility barriers which simply do not exist
online.  In practice, however, websites, like physical structures, often require
modifications to become accessible to disabled users, particularly those with
visual, hearing, intellectual, and mobility disabilities.13  Many people with dis-
abilities interact with the Internet using assistive technologies including mod-
ified mice, speech-recognition software, and screen readers that read aloud
the visual content displayed on a webpage.14  A website that does not con-
form to certain practices minimizes the functionality of these assistive tech-
nologies, rendering the site partially or completely unusable to individuals
relying on such adaptive equipment.  Common practices such as embedded
flash content, videos with no audio or closed-caption descriptions, and visual
CAPTCHA registration requirements constitute just a few of the many exam-
ples of accessibility barriers that continue to plague the Internet.
As a result of these accessibility issues, the threshold question whether
commercial websites fall within the purview of the ADA’s public accommoda-
tions provision has wide-ranging implications for both the disability and busi-
ness communities.  Currently, no set of regulations mandates that owners of
such websites make them accessible.  The World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C), through its Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI), has promulgated rec-
ommendations aimed at addressing many accessibility concerns.15  Though
they do not carry the force of law, the DOJ has called these suggestions the
13 See Shawn Lawton Henry et al., Introduction to Web Accessibility, W3C WEB ACCESSIBIL-
ITY INITIATIVE (Sept. 2005), http://www.w3.org/WAI/intro/accessibility.php.
14 See Shawn Lawton Henry & Liam McGee, Accessibility, W3C (Mar. 20, 2014), http://
www.w3.org/standards/webdesign/accessibility.
15 See Ben Caldwell et al., Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0, W3C RECOM-
MENDATION (Dec. 11, 2008), http://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG20/ (outlining the need for
accessibility as well as recommended standards to achieve accessibility).  Regulations
passed under the Rehabilitation Act cover similar accessibility issues for websites attached
to federal agencies. See 36 C.F.R. § 1194.1 (2014).
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“recognized international industry standards”16 and has used them as the lit-
mus test against which the Department measures compliance in consent
decrees with commercial websites.17  Determining that private, commercial
websites are places of public accommodation would permit the DOJ to use its
statutory authority to globally impose these or similar requirements upon all
such websites.18
A. Developments in the Case Law
The ADA defines a place of public accommodation as a private entity
that has operations that affect interstate commerce and falls into at least one
of twelve categories of businesses.19  The list of covered entities is broad,
encompassing hotels, parks, the offices of certain professionals, educational
institutions, health clubs, and others.20  As discussed below, courts first inter-
preted these provisions as covering only physical, brick-and-mortar establish-
ments.  Over time, some courts developed a “nexus” approach, holding that
the statute covered certain entities such as a website or a telephone-based
contest so long as a sufficient nexus existed between such entity and a physi-
cal structure.  Beginning in 2012, the Massachusetts District Court and DOJ
consent decrees have interpreted the statute to cover private, commercial
websites existing only in cyberspace.
The question whether the Act covers non-physical entities as well as phys-
ical structures primarily arose in the context of insurance policies.  The ADA
explicitly covers insurance offices in its defined list of places of public accom-
modation.21  The question became whether a discriminatory insurance pol-
icy presented to a disabled employee through his employer constituted
discrimination of the goods and services offered by a place of public accom-
modation under the statute, or if the scope only reached instances in which
the disabled individual had purchased the policy directly from the insurance
office.
In Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesalers Ass’n of New
England Inc.,22 the plaintiff, who was the sole shareholder and president of
16 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Enters
Consent Decree with National Tax Preparer H&R Block Requiring Accessibility of Websites
and Mobile Apps Under Americans with Disabilities Act (Mar. 6, 2014), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-enters-consent-decree-national-tax-preparer-
hr-block-requiring.
17 See Consent Decree, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. HRB Dig. LLC, No. 1:13-cv-10799-
GAO (D. Mass. Mar. 25, 2014), [hereinafter H&R Block Consent Decree]; Settlement
Agreement Between the United States of America and Ahold U.S.A., Inc., and Peapod,
LLC Under the Americans with Disabilities Act §§ 12(a)–(c), DJ 202-63-169 (Nov. 17,
2014) [hereinafter Peapod Settlement Agreement].
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2012).
19 Id. § 12181(7).
20 Id.
21 Id. § 12181(7)(F).
22 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
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Carparts,23 brought a discrimination claim against the defendant insurance
company after the defendant capped lifetime expenses related to the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus to $25,000 compared with the $1 million caps it
extended to other diagnoses.24
To answer whether the policy constituted discrimination by a place of
public accommodation, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit looked first
to the plain language of the statute.  After citing the statutory definition of
public accommodations and the list of twelve categories—which it character-
ized as “illustrative”25—the court stated, without elaboration, that “[t]he
plain meaning of the terms do not require ‘public accommodations’ to have
physical structures for persons to enter.”26  Even if the term was not plain on
its face, the court stated that it was “at worst[ ] ambiguous.  This ambiguity,
considered together with agency regulations and public policy concerns, per-
suade[d] [the court] that the phrase is not limited to actual physical
structures.”27
The court also noted that neither the text of the statute nor its accompa-
nying regulations makes any mention of physical boundaries or structures.28
Further, the public accommodations provisions included “travel service” as
one of its categories, which the court took to mean that the statute contem-
plated the inclusion of other types of accommodations that did not require
physical entry by customers.29
Many travel services conduct business by telephone or correspondence with-
out requiring their customers to enter an office in order to obtain their ser-
vices.  Likewise, one can easily imagine the existence of other service
establishments conducting business [only] by mail and phone . . . . It would
be irrational to conclude that persons who enter an office to purchase ser-
vices are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same services
over the telephone or by mail are not.  Congress could not have intended
such an absurd result.30
The court then combined its broad textual reading with public policy
concerns to find that construing public accommodations strictly so as to
apply only to physical structures would “run afoul of the purposes of the ADA
23 Id. at 14.
24 Id. at 14–15.
25 Id. at 19.
26 Id.
27 Id. (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 20. But see Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommo-
dations and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544, 35,550 (July 26, 1991) (defining
a public accommodation as a “facility” for the purposes of a place of public accommoda-
tion as “all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling
stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or per-
sonal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or equipment is
located”).
29 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19.
30 Id.
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and would severely frustrate” Congress’s intent.31  It cited the ADA’s purpose
of creating a national mandate to eliminate discrimination and statements
from the House Report concerning Congress’s intent to give the disabled
equal access to “the economic and social mainstream of American life.”32
This line of analysis heavily emphasized the statute’s broad remedial purpose.
It did not discuss how the statute’s “standards” purpose should influence its
interpretation.
The Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Parker v. Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co.33  There, the plaintiff, who had been denied insurance
benefits related to her depression, brought suit against her insurance com-
pany for extending more comprehensive benefits to those with physical disa-
bilities under its long-term disability policy than to those with mental health
disabilities.34  Looking to the plain language of the statute, the Parker court
stated that Carparts had given the statutory terms “unintended breadth”
because it had failed to apply the noscitur a sociis canon, which directs judges
to determine the meaning of a term by contextualizing it within the sur-
rounding statutory language.35  Applying this canon, the Parker court found
that places of public accommodation referred only to the list of enumerated
physical structures and the goods and services which those structures offer to
the public.36  Contextualized within the list of other physical structures, the
Parker court stated that the word “service” used in the travel service provision
did not indicate that the statute contemplated including entities conducting
their business solely by phone or mail as public accommodations.  Rather,
“service” was the only word available to aptly describe the physical place from
which travel agents offered goods and services to the public.37  Since the
plaintiff, as a member of the public, could not enter the insurance office to
purchase her policy, nor could a member of the public enter plaintiff’s
employer’s office to purchase the same, the court found that the insurance
policy did not constitute a good or benefit offered by a place of public
accommodation.38
The Third Circuit applied this same approach in Ford v. Schering-Plough
Corp.,39 which also involved a plaintiff raising discrimination claims based on
disparities between insurance benefits offered to those with physical as
opposed to mental health disabilities.40  The Third Circuit found that “places
of public accommodation” referred to physical places, including the insur-
ance office in question.41  However, the policy offered by Schering-Plough to
31 Id. at 20.
32 Id. at 19 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990)).
33 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
34 Id. at 1008.
35 Id. at 1014.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1011.
39 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
40 Id. at 603.
41 Id. at 612.
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Ford’s employer constituted one of the “terms and conditions” of Ford’s
employment,42 not a good or service offered to the public.  Therefore, the
defendant’s actions did not qualify as discrimination by a place of public
accommodation.43  The court also held that, since the public accommoda-
tion provision only referred to physical structures, a “nexus” must exist
between a public accommodation and any good or service it offers in order
for a plaintiff to raise a cognizable claim of discrimination of goods or ser-
vices.  The court stated that “the ‘goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, or accommodations’ concerning which a disabled person cannot suffer
discrimination are not free-standing concepts but rather all refer to the statu-
tory term ‘public accommodation’ and thus to what these places of public
accommodation provide.”44  To support its interpretation, the court looked
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s prohibition on racial discrimination in places
of public accommodation, citing cases that held that the statute did not cover
discriminatory membership practices and other “operations unconnected to
any physical facility.”45
The Ninth Circuit joined the Third and Sixth Circuits in Weyer v. Twenti-
eth Century Fox Film Corp.46  The court applied the same line of reasoning to
find that no nexus existed between the plaintiff and the services offered to
the public by the insurance office at issue.47
Courts have followed this “nexus” approach in other contexts.  In
Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions, Ltd.,48 a group of mobility- and hearing-
impaired individuals sued the game show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?
Plaintiffs claimed that the screening process for contestants, which involved
communicating via telephone and using the phone’s keypad to rapidly
answer questions, constituted a discriminatory screening or eligibility
requirement of a place of public accommodation.49  The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss, claiming that Title III did not cover the contestant hotline
since the hotline itself was not a physical place.50  The Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, in part by distinguishing the
case at hand from the insurance cases discussed above.51  The court stated
that those cases “do not stand for the broad proposition”52 that “discrimina-
tion must occur on site to offend title III.”53  Rather, “[a]t most, they can be
42 Id.
43 Id. at 612–13 (“Since Ford received her disability benefits via her employment at
Schering, she had no nexus to MetLife’s ‘insurance office’ and thus was not discriminated
against in connection with a public accommodation.”).
44 Id. at 613.
45 Id.
46 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000).
47 Id. at 1115.
48 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
49 Id. at 1281.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1284 n.8.
52 Id. at 1285 n.8.
53 Id. at 1286 n.10.
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read to require a nexus between the challenged service and the premises of
the public accommodation.”54  Here, the court found that a nexus existed
between the discriminatory barrier and the physical place of public accom-
modation—in this case, the theater where the game show took place.  There-
fore, unlike the insurance contexts, the plaintiff had established a nexus to a
physical place.55
In contrast, in Stoutenborough v. National Football League, Inc.,56 the Sixth
Circuit held that the National Football League (NFL), its member teams, and
various media outlets that broadcast football games were not places of public
accommodation under the statute.57  As such, a television broadcast of a foot-
ball game did not qualify as a service provided by a place of public accommo-
dation.58  There, a group of hearing-impaired individuals challenged the
NFL’s blackout provision that prohibited broadcasting local games that had
not sold out seventy-two hours prior to the beginning of the game.59  The
hearing impaired individuals alleged that this practice constituted discrimi-
nation of goods and services by a place of public accommodation.60
First, the court looked to the plain language of the statute, reiterating
that places of public accommodation referred to physical structures, thus
excluding the NFL, its member teams, and the media.61  Though not explic-
itly adopting the “nexus” language, the court stated that “the ‘service’ that
[the plaintiffs] seek to obtain . . . does not involve a ‘place of public accom-
modation.’  Although a game is played in a ‘place of public accommodation’
and may be viewed on television in another ‘place of public accommodation,’
that does not suffice.”62  Since the plaintiffs did not connect the challenged
service with an entity covered under the statute, the court affirmed the dis-
trict court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss.63
B. Application to the Internet
The courts first seriously addressed the question whether the ADA cov-
ers commercial websites in Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.64  There,
54 Id. at 1285 n.8.
55 Id.  For a discussion of cases which upheld discrimination claims in other civil rights
contexts which took place “at a distance,” see id. at 1285.
56 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995).
57 Id. at 583.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 582.
60 Id. at 581–82.
61 Id. at 583.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 582.
64 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002).  Two previous lawsuits addressed this ques-
tion.  One, brought by the National Federation of the Blind against America Online, set-
tled before trial, with America Online agreeing to make its software more accessible to the
blind. See Paul Taylor, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Internet, 7 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 26, 32 (2001).  The other involved a plaintiff claiming that OKbridge, which oper-
ated an online Bridge tournament, unlawfully excluded him due to his disability and thus
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visually impaired plaintiffs claimed that southwest.com was a place of public
accommodation and challenged the accessibility of the goods and services
provided through its “virtual ticket counters.”65  The ticket counters used
graphics rather than text, which had the effect of vastly limiting the function-
ality of the plaintiffs’ screenreading technology.66  The plaintiffs alleged that
the website itself fell within three out of the twelve categories outlined in the
statute, claiming that it was a place of “exhibition, display and a sales estab-
lishment.”67  Relying on Carparts, they argued that the statutory definition of
public accommodations was not confined solely to physical structures.68
The district court opted instead to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
in Rendon, holding that the plain and unambiguous language of the statute
covered only physical structures.69  It reached this conclusion by relying on
two modes of analysis.  First, the court focused on the statute’s “standards”
purpose by stating that the court must follow the “comprehensive” defini-
tions set out by Congress.70  It expounded upon this idea by noting that
“[w]here Congress has created specifically enumerated rights and expressed
the intent of setting forth ‘clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards,’
“courts must follow the law as written . . . . Here, to fall within the scope of
the ADA as presently drafted, a public accommodation must be a physical,
concrete structure.”71  The court further observed that “[t]o expand the
ADA to cover ‘virtual’ spaces would be to create new rights without well-
defined standards;”72 as such, the court must “wait for Congress to adopt or
revise legislatively-defined standards that apply to [these] rights.”73  Second,
the court utilized the ejusdem generis canon, which states that judges should
limit the scope of general words which follow specifically enumerated lists to
cover only instances similar to the items explicitly listed.74  In doing so, the
had discriminated against him with respect to the enjoyment of the goods and services
provided by a public accommodation.  The district court found that the bridge tourna-
ment was not a public accommodation because it “provided its services over the Internet.”
See Richard E. Moberly, The Americans with Disabilities Act in Cyberspace: Applying the “Nexus”
Approach to Private Internet Websites, 55 MERCER L. REV. 963, 970 (2004).  The opinion was
unpublished. Id.  On appeal, the Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief in
support of the plaintiff’s position that the bridge tournament was a place of public accom-
modation. ADA GOES ONLINE, supra note 8, at 16.  However, the decision of the district
court was affirmed on other grounds in a brief per curiam opinion. See Hooks v.
OKbridge, Inc., 232 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2000).
65 Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
66 Id. at 1316.
67 Id. at 1318.
68 Id. at 1319.
69 Id. at 1318–19.
70 Id. at 1318 (citing Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir.
2000)).
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court interpreted the three general terms “exhibition,” “display,” and “sales
establishment” as covering only physical structures.75
Additionally, the court also applied, but found lacking, the nexus
approach.  Unlike Rendon, where the plaintiffs established a nexus between a
good or service and a physical theater, the plaintiffs here sought “equal
access to Southwest’s virtual ‘ticket counters’ as they exist online.”76  Since
neither southwest.com in general nor the counter in particular had any loca-
tion in physical space, the nexus test failed and the court dismissed the
claims.77
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit addressed this question again in National Fed-
eration of the Blind v. Target Corp.78  There, plaintiffs challenged certain
aspects of target.com which remained inaccessible to their screenreading
technology.79  The case differed from Access Now, however, because the plain-
tiffs alleged that these technological accessibility barriers prevented not only
access to services provided through target.com, but also to physical Target
stores.80  Accordingly, the case presented the question whether the scope of
the ADA covered instances in which a nexus existed between a challenged
service (here, target.com) and a physical structure (here, a brick-and-mortar
Target store).81  In applying the nexus test, the court stated that the
approach did not merely apply to barriers of physical access, but to all barri-
ers to the goods and services of a place of public accommodation.82  The
court found that Target stores fell within the public accommodation provi-
sion and that “many of the benefits and privileges of the website are services
of the Target stores” to which disabled individuals have a right of access
under the ADA.83  In keeping with this approach, the court found that the
ADA did not cover aspects of target.com that had no connection to the physi-
cal Target stores.84  Therefore, though the court followed the Ninth Circuit
precedent established in Weyer that a place of public accommodation refers
to a physical space, it included website services related to that physical space
as goods and services connected with a place of public accommodation.85
Following the distinction set out in Access Now and Target, the Northern
District of California dismissed claims against Facebook,86 eBay,87 and Net-
75 Id. at 1319.
76 Id. at 1321.
77 Id. at 1321–22.
78 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
79 Id. at 950.
80 Id. at 952, 954.
81 Id. at 954.
82 Id. at 953–54.
83 Id. at 954, 956.
84 Id. at 956.
85 Id.
86 Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115–16 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
87 Earll v. eBay, Inc., No. 5:11–cv–00262–JF (HRL), 2011 WL 3955485, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 7, 2011).
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flix,88 all because these websites operated wholly in cyberspace with no con-
nection to a physical, brick-and-mortar structure.
A recent string of settlements has disrupted this trend.  In 2012, the
National Association of the Deaf reached a settlement with Netflix after sur-
viving summary judgment on its claim that Netflix’s Watch Instantly video
streaming service was a public accommodation.89  Plaintiffs relied on the
Carparts language that argued that interpreting the statute to prohibit dis-
crimination where a physical structure exists but to permit it for companies
existing only by phone or mail would lead to absurd, irrational results that
Congress could not have intended.90  The court agreed and, by extension,
applied this rationale to the Internet for the first time.91  In doing so, the
court explicitly relied on the explanation of the Carparts court that such an
approach was consistent with the broad remedial purpose of the statute.92
The DOJ filed a statement of interest in this case, stating that it “has long
interpreted” websites to be covered by Title III,93 and the fact that it had not
yet promulgated regulations covering websites should not be used to “sup-
port any inference whatsoever” that the ADA does not, or should not, cover
websites.94
After this decision, Netflix—the decision from California notwithstand-
ing—agreed in a consent decree to make all of its streaming videos accessible
to the hearing-impaired by incorporating closed captioning within two
years.95
In March 2014, the DOJ reached a similar settlement with the tax prepa-
ration service H&R Block, in which the company agreed to make the services
provided through its website, its Online Tax Preparation Products and, nota-
bly, its mobile applications, accessible to the blind.96  Though H&R Block
also operates physical retail stores, the consent decree treats the website and
mobile applications as separate entities owned by the company.  The decree
states that H&R Block will conform its websites and mobile applications to
W3C guidelines within specified time frames97 and will ensure that all third
88 Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1023–25 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (analyzing
the facts under the ADA to find that Netflix had not violated two state public accommoda-
tions statutes).
89 Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202 (D. Mass. 2012).
90 Id. at 200.
91 Id. (noting that the discrepancy in coverage between phone- and mail-based busi-
nesses and traditional businesses outlined in Carparts “applies with equal force to services
purchased over the Internet”).
92 Id.
93 Statement of Interest of the United States of America in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 4, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F.
Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012) (No. 11-cv-30168-MAP).
94 Id. at 12.
95 Consent Decree at § 3(b), Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., No. 11-30168-MAP
(D. Mass. 2012) [hereinafter Netflix Consent Decree].
96 H&R Block Consent Decree, supra note 17, § 6.
97 Id. §§ 12(a)–(b).
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party plug-ins used on its sites also comply with these guidelines.98  The
decree makes a special exception for the plug-in, which displays the locations
of retail stores on an inaccessible map application, granting H&R Block an
extension of an additional fourteen months to find an accessible solution.99
The DOJ reached a second agreement with Peapod, the operators of an
online-only grocery store, on November 17, 2014.100  Unlike the H&R Block
settlement, which was reached as part of a class action suit, the DOJ instituted
this action directly by invoking its authority to initiate compliance reviews
under Title III of the ADA.101  In a decree analogous to that of H&R Block,
Peapod agreed to adopt W3C guidelines for its websites, mobile applica-
tions,102 and third-party content, subject to certain exceptions.103  Like Net-
flix, it also agreed to adopt an accessibility coordinator, formulate an
accessibility policy, train personnel, and solicit consumer feedback on
compliance.104
The DOJ’s Netflix Statement of Interest, as well as its involvement in the
Peapod and H&R Block consent decrees, illustrate the current Department’s
position that private, commercial websites with no connection to physical
structures fall within the scope of the ADA.  By extension, the Department
takes the position that it has authority to promulgate regulations on the sub-
ject.105  In particular, the Peapod Settlement Agreement—representing the
DOJ’s most recent action on this issue—states that the parties agree that if
the DOJ should pass Title III regulations under the ADA governing the acces-
sibility of websites, then either party can request a meeting to discuss whether
such regulations necessitate modification of the agreement.106  Notwith-
standing these assertions, the Department has taken only the first step toward
regulating the area by issuing an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking on
July 26, 2010107—ten years after the passage of similar regulations pertaining
to the websites of federal agencies.108  While the period for public comment
ended in January 2011,109 the Attorney General has taken no action since
that time and has continually pushed back the date for the proposed notice
98 Id. § 12(c).
99 Id.
100 Peapod Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 12.
101 Id. § 3.
102 Id. §§ 12(a)–(c).
103 Id. §§ 12(c)–(e).
104 Id. §§ 13–20; see also H&R Block Consent Decree, supra note 17, §§ 13–20 (outlin-
ing the same provisions for the H&R Block Consent Decree).
105 See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2012).
106 Peapod Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 12(f).
107 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information
and Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed.
Reg. 43,460 (proposed July 26, 2010).
108 See 36 C.F.R. § 1194.1 (2014).
109 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information
and Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed.
Reg. 43,460 (proposed July 26, 2010).
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of rulemaking as it approaches.  Most recently, the Department set the date
for March 2015.110  However, as of July 2015, the Department has neither
continued with the rulemaking process nor set a new date on which the
rulemaking process will begin.
II.  THE ARGUMENT AGAINST INCLUDING WEBSITES AS PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS
The preceding case law review indicates a move toward tacitly accepting
that the ADA’s public accommodations provision covers websites, even web-
sites wholly divorced from physical structures.111  Nevertheless, undertaking
an assessment of whether the statute supports this interpretation still holds
value.  If an examination shows that the statutory text does not support the
current, inclusive interpretation, then those seeking to clearly establish their
rights of access to private commercial websites must act to have such rights
expressly outlined in the statute, lest future courts or administrative person-
nel adopt a narrower, more restrictive view.  This Part relies upon the text’s
plain meaning, Congress’s failure to amend in the wake of historical events,
and the statute’s standards purpose to conclude that the Act does not permit
continuing to follow the current interpretation.
A. Plain Meaning
As stated earlier, the ADA defines place of public accommodation as a
business that must fall into at least one of twelve listed categories.112  Each of
the twelve categories provides a list of examples and ends with a slightly
broader invocation such as “other service establishment,” “other place of
public gathering,” or “other social service center establishment.”113  Settling
the question whether these catch-all phrases can be extended to cover web-
sites begins with an examination of the plain language of the statute.  Two
well-known canons of construction—ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis—
demonstrate that the plain meaning of the public accommodations defini-
tion refers only to physical structures.
First, the ejusdem generis canon states that judges should read general
words following a list of specifically enumerated terms to apply only to the
110 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information
and Services of Public Accommodations, RIN of 1190-AA61, http://www.reginfo.gov/pub-
lic/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201404&RIN=1190-AA61 (listing the new notice of pro-
posed rulemaking date as March, 2015); see also More Delay for DOJ Web Regs—Does it Matter?,
L. OFF. LAINEY FEINGOLD (June 2, 2014), http://lflegal.com/2014/06/doj-delay/ (noting
that the DOJ has continually pushed the dates back as they approach).
111 See, e.g., Adriana Gardella, Does Your Website Violate The Americans With Disabilities Act?,
FORBES (Apr. 2, 2015, 03:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adrianagardella/2015/04/
02/does-your-website-violate-the-americans-with-disabilities-act/ (noting the rise in suits by
plaintiffs and the DOJ’s increasing review of websites for compliance, and recommending
that retail website operators hire a consultant to ensure compliance with W3C guidelines).
112 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2012).
113 Id. §§ 12181(7)(A)–(I).
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same “general kind or class” as the enumerated terms.114  Here, since each of
the twelve separate categories contains lists of physical structures, judges
should interpret the final, broader phrases to also apply only to physical
structures.  To provide one example, one category prohibits discrimination
in “an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public
gathering.”115  Standing alone, “place of public gathering” could invoke
images of a website providing streaming lectures, concerts, or other such con-
tent.  Applying the canon, however, constrains this interpretation and indi-
cates that the final phrase only covers structures with attributes similar to
those possessed by the listed exemplars, including having a physical location
in space.
Second, application of the noscitur a sociis canon, which dictates that “a
word is known by the company it keeps,”116 strengthens this interpretation.
Not only do all of the specific exemplars refer to physical structures,117 but
six of the twelve catch-all phrases also contain specific language that cabins
their application to physical structures.  Five of the twelve phrases use the
word “establishment,”118 which strongly connotes a physical place and struc-
ture.119  The seventh listed category prevents discrimination in a “terminal,
depot, or other station used for specified public transportation.”120  Use of
the word “station” here also clearly refers to a physical space.  The section as
a whole, as well as its twelve composite sub-parts, plainly speaks only to physi-
cal spaces.
Other provisions within the Act concerning public accommodations also
support an interpretation covering only physical structures.  Section
12186(b) delegates to the Attorney General the authority to promulgate reg-
ulations concerning the covered public accommodations, excluding trans-
portation services.121  These standards must be consistent with the
regulations passed by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compli-
ance Board.122  In turn, the Board’s standards must “ensure that buildings,
facilities, rail passenger cars, and vehicles are accessible, in terms of architec-
ture and design, transportation, and communication.”123  Here, too, the text
confines itself purely to physical structures.124  The Act also contains a sec-
tion entitled “New Construction and Alterations in Public Accommodations
114 Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 78 (1990).
115 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(D).
116 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 694 (1995).
117 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7)(A)–(L).
118 See id. §§ 12181(7)(A), (B), (E), (F), (K).
119 See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 778 (1986) (defining estab-
lishment as “a more or less fixed and usu. sizable place of business or residence together with
all the things that are an essential part of it (as grounds, furniture, fixtures, retinue, employ-
ees)” (emphasis added)).
120 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(G).
121 Id. § 12186(b).
122 Id. § 12186(c).
123 Id. § 12204(b).
124 See Maroney, supra note 9, at 198.
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and Commercial Facilities.”125  The section contains two sets of standards
outlining what constitutes discrimination in “public accommodations and
commercial facilities.”126  The first makes it discriminatory “to design and
construct [inaccessible] facilities for first occupancy” after a specified time
frame.127  The second makes it discriminatory to alter “a facility” used by “an
establishment” in a way that is not accessible to the disabled.128  In particular,
the provision dictates that “to the maximum extent feasible, the path of travel
to the altered area and the bathrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains
serving the altered area” should remain accessible.129  Finally, the section
specifically exempts certain types of buildings from the mandate to install
elevators.130  Read as a whole, this section removes any remaining ambiguity
in the meaning of terms such as “facility,” “entity,” “public accommodation,”
and “establishment” that might otherwise remain open to a broader interpre-
tation.  More important, this section disproves the assertion of the Carparts
court that nothing in the Act’s language makes reference to physical bounda-
ries or structures.131  Rather, all references to public accommodations per-
tain to physical structures, and all prohibitions against discrimination in the
access to new facilities describe physical aspects of those structures.
Two principal rejoinders counter this textual approach.  The first
involves invoking the absurdity doctrine as evidence that such an interpreta-
tion leads to a result so incongruent with the purpose of the statute that no
reasonable member of Congress would have agreed to it.  The second holds
that even if the initial statute contemplated only physical structures, the fact
that people frequently speak of the Internet and websites as though they are
physical places brings such websites squarely within the statute’s coverage.
1. The Absurdity Doctrine
The animating premise of the absurdity doctrine is that if applying a
statute according to its letter would “sharply contradict[ ] commonly held
social values,” then the statute must contain a failure of expression which
Congress would have corrected if it had noticed.132  Applied here, it holds
that interpreting the public accommodations provisions to cover only physi-
cal structures leads to absurd results because it would prohibit disability-
based discrimination against an in-store customer while permitting similar
discrimination by an entity that conducted all of its business by phone,
125 42 U.S.C. § 12183.
126 Id. § 12183(a).
127 Id. § 12183(a)(1).
128 Id. § 12183(a)(2).
129 Id.
130 Id. § 12183(b).
131 See Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st
Cir. 1994).
132 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2389–90
(2003).
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mail,133 and, through extension into the digital age, the Internet.134  Thus,
this doctrine involves reading the statute in light of its legislative intent.  It
also heavily emphasizes the ADA’s broad remedial purpose; it argues that the
narrower interpretation absurdly thwarts both Congress’s very purpose in
enacting the statute as well as the social values espoused and promoted
through the Act.
Applying the absurdity doctrine here presents four distinct issues.  First,
those advancing this line of reasoning bolster their argument with the obvi-
ous fact that the Internet simply had not yet become a household phenome-
non in 1990, rendering Congress incapable of foreseeing and, hence,
including websites within the statute’s scope.135  The DOJ, for instance, has
analogized excluding websites from the ADA to claiming that the First
Amendment does not cover electronic speech because such speech did not
exist at the founding.136  This comparison lacks merit because it overlooks
the fact that, though the Internet did not enjoy widespread popularity in
1990, entities that conducted businesses solely or primarily by phone or cata-
log did exist.  The question is not whether members of Congress could or
could not have foreseen a world in which the Internet dominated commer-
cial life; the question is whether they could have addressed through legisla-
tion their own contemporaneous experience in which business entities
interacted with customers through means other than a walk-in physical struc-
ture.  As at least one state had done in its public accommodations statutes,
Congress could have written broad language that unquestionably encom-
passed “a business . . . of any kind” that held itself out to the public,137 but
they did not do so.  Many reasons exist as to why Congress may not have
addressed mail- and phone-order businesses under the statute.  They could
have believed that this area did not constitute a major source of discrimina-
tion facing disabled Americans, they could have lost the battle during the
legislative process, or they could have simply written the language poorly.
However it came about, the fact that the statute does not expressly address
phone- and mail-order businesses as public accommodations does not rise to
the level of manifest unreasonableness such that invoking the absurdity doc-
trine becomes appropriate.  This is especially true given that the ADA is a
statute riddled with compromise (discussed below).
Second, the argument presupposes that applying the statute would con-
tradict widely held social values because it would prevent disabled individuals
133 See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19.
134 See Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D. Mass. 2012).
135 See id. (“[S]uch web-based services did not exist when the ADA was passed in 1990
and, thus, could not have been explicitly included in the Act . . . .”); Brief of the United
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at *16, Hooks v. OKBridge, Inc., 232 F.3d
208 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-50891) [hereinafter Brief of the United States].
136 Brief of the United States, supra note 135, at *17.
137 See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Prop-
erty, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1415 & n.593 (1996) (describing Minnesota’s broad public
accommodations statute).
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from enjoying the same rights as able-bodied individuals, which was the very
purpose behind the enactment of Title III.138  But this raises the question:
what right of access to public accommodations did able-bodied individuals
enjoy in 1990?  In his extensive analysis of public accommodation history and
case law, Professor Joseph Singer shows that neither the common law nor
federal statutes fully support the modern public policies and social values
that favor equal rights of access to all businesses that hold themselves out to
the public.139  Notably for purposes of this discussion, Singer frames his arti-
cle, published in 1996, around his conclusion that the owner of a retail estab-
lishment could, prominent civil rights legislation notwithstanding, still
arguably lawfully exclude an African-American customer.140  Singer argues
that at and before the founding, all “common callings” incurred a duty both
to serve all individuals and to charge them a reasonable price.141  This duty
stemmed from an implied contract in fact where, because the owner of a
common calling held out his property as being open to the public, he
incurred the duty to accommodate anyone from the public who might wish
to enter.142
Singer contends that American case law followed this broad “holding
out” theory143 until the post-Reconstruction and Jim Crow era, at which time
it narrowed quite considerably.144  Segregationists pushed for a narrower
conception of public accommodations law that covered only inns and com-
mon carriers in an attempt to justify excluding African Americans from other
businesses held out to the public.145  Importantly, the fact that the duty to
serve arose from an implied duty rather than from a statutory command
138 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200 (“Carparts’s reasoning applies
with equal force to services purchased over the Internet . . . . In a society in which business
is increasingly conducted online, excluding businesses that sell services through the
Internet from the ADA would ‘run afoul of the purposes of the ADA and would severely
frustrate Congress’s intent that individuals with disabilities fully enjoy the goods, services,
privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of the general pub-
lic.’” (quoting Carparts, 37 F.3d at 20)); see also Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d
557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting, in dicta, that the “core meaning” of the prohibition
against discrimination in places of public accommodation “is that the owner or operator of
a . . . Web site, or other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space) that is
open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility” (citation
omitted)).
139 Singer, supra note 137, at 1289–91 (describing this principle in the context of race
discrimination in retail stores).
140 Id. at 1286–90.
141 Id. at 1303–04.
142 Id. at 1298.
143 Id. at 1312.
144 Id. at 1402 (noting that this process “unalterably changed” the common law right of
access such that “courts and legal commentators [began] to state categorically that busi-
nesses other than innkeepers and common carriers had no duty to serve the public unless
a statute limited their discretion”).
145 Id. at 1300; see also A.K. Sandoval-Strausz, Travelers, Strangers, and Jim Crow: Law,
Public Accommodations, and Civil Rights in America, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 53, 54 (2005) (argu-
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allowed segregationists to advance their arguments more easily.146  This
effort was so successful that it “unalterably changed” the common law right of
access.147  By the time civil rights efforts redoubled in the 1960s, a presumed
right to exclude had replaced the holding out theory unless a statute explic-
itly circumscribed a business owner’s discretion.148
Therefore, advocates for the absurdity doctrine must rely on the applica-
tion of an anachronistic understanding of rights of access to public accom-
modations to support their argument.  In 1990, members of the able-bodied
public did not enjoy a legally ensconced, indiscriminate right of access to
every business that held itself out to the public.  Proponents for the inclusion
of websites thus cannot argue that interpreting the statute to exclude them
would thwart Congress’s intent to give the disabled equal access to “the
goods, services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately to other
members of the general public.”149
Third, the absurdity argument presupposes not only that Congress
would have included the Internet had the Internet enjoyed widespread use in
1990, but also that this inclusion would have survived bicameralism and pre-
sentment unscathed by legislative compromise.  Since judges cannot ascer-
tain the outcomes that would have resulted from a hypothetical legislative
proposal, presuming success grants a windfall to the disabled which they may
not actually have achieved in reality.
Fourth, as a more general matter, the absurdity doctrine implicates sepa-
ration of powers concerns by inviting the Court to enter the exclusively con-
gressional realm of policymaking.150  It is the province of the Court to say
what the law is,151 not “to rectify policy or political judgments by the Legisla-
tive Branch, however egregiously they may disserve the public interest.”152
As the Access Now court noted, if the statute clearly speaks to the issue, then
the Court must adhere to its text and leave it to Congress to correct its own
errors and to effectuate its policy goals clearly.153
2. The Internet as Physical Place
An alternative rejoinder to a strict textual interpretation holds that web-
sites fall squarely within the “catch-all” phrases of the statute because, in com-
ing that progressive legislatures used the same emerging common law duty to serve only
travelers as their “entering wedge” to seek broader equal rights for African Americans).
146 Singer, supra note 137, at 1298 (noting that the law also did not “expressly immu-
nize” businesses from the duty to serve).
147 Id. at 1402.
148 Id.
149 Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D. Mass. 2012)
(quoting Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st
Cir. 1994)).
150 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
151 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
152 Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting).
153 Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
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mon usage, society refers to the Internet as a physical space.154  People
“build” web “sites” which must close to undergo construction, for example.
This argument lacks substance for the very simple reason that the English
language is riddled with metaphorical attempts to describe abstract concepts
in concrete terms.  The common parlance of English language disparages
the “ivory tower” of academia, touts the value of free expression through “a
marketplace of ideas,” and advocates “keeping a place in one’s heart” for
those one loves.  Women seeking to reach the pinnacle of success fight to
break the glass ceiling while social commentators lament the burning of
bridges and the building up of walls in personal relationships.  Successful
communication involves the sharing of common meanings, and these exam-
ples show that, though parity in the terminology exists, English speakers do
not confuse metaphorical speech with references to an actual, physical
structure.
So, too, with the Internet.  Though the English language has conceptual-
ized it using metaphors borrowed from the physical realm, Americans, as well
as the Supreme Court,155 commonly understand the Internet as having no
physical features and adhering to no physical place or structure.  Simultane-
ously, the common understanding of words such as “establishment” refers to
physical, brick-and-mortar structures.  Allowing for the extension of statutory
terms through the invocation of metaphorical analogies would vastly expand
the breadth of Congress’s power in this and many other technology-related
contexts.  To prevent this from occurring, judges should interpret statutory
terms according to their commonly accepted shared meanings unless Con-
gress has indicated that a specialized meaning should be used instead.  Con-
gress is free to pass a statute that clearly and unambiguously applies to the
Internet using the proper terminology, something unquestionably within its
legitimate authority.
B. The Use of Legislative History
The courts and commentators have also turned to legislative history to
argue for a broader interpretation of the ADA’s Public Accommodations Pro-
vision.156  This view reads the legislative history alongside the broad remedial
purpose of the statute to argue that Congress’s principal purpose was to
enact a statute that forwarded broad public policy considerations.  Therefore,
the statute should be read broadly in order to effectuate those policy
goals.157  These supportive fragments include a sentence in the Senate
154 See Colin Crawford, Cyberplace: Defining a Right to Internet Access Through Public Accom-
modation Law, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 225, 229–30 (2003); ADA GOES ONLINE, supra note 8, at
24–25.
155 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (describing cyberspace as being
“located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the
world, with access to the Internet”).
156 See supra note 8.
157 See, e.g., Brief of the United States, supra note 135, at *15–16 (acknowledging the
ejusdem generis canon, but arguing that any tension between the ordinary meaning of the
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL110.txt unknown Seq: 20  8-DEC-15 17:06
466 notre dame law review [vol. 91:1
Report stating that “[t]he Committee intends that the ‘other similar’ termi-
nology should be construed liberally consistent with the intent of the legisla-
tion.”158  Additionally, the House Report states that “the types of
accommodation[s] and services . . . should keep pace with the rapidly chang-
ing technology of the times.”159
The principal objection to the use of legislative history—namely, that
relying upon extra-statutory sources risks upsetting the legislative compro-
mise and the protections afforded by the bicameralism and presentment pro-
cess160—features prominently in a discussion of the ADA due to the
overwhelmingly bipartisan support the bill garnered in Congress.  The House
approved the bill by a vote of 377 to 28, whereas the Senate passed it by a
margin of 91 to 6.161  Representative Tony Coelho, who sponsored the bill in
the House, later stated that “if [the Act] had become a Democratic bill, [the
ADA] would have lost. . . . It had to be bipartisan.”162  The National Council
on Disability, a federal independent agency charged with formulating disabil-
ity-related policy, helped foster discussions surrounding the ADA.  It later
described the efforts to achieve bipartisanship as including “cooperative
meetings” between both political parties “to craft compromise provisions and
revise problematic language in the bills.”163  These meetings also included
members of the business sector in order “to work out a bipartisan compromise
bill that could obtain the support of the business community as well as that of
the disability community.”164  This self-conscious desire to amass wide bipar-
tisan support and cooperation from the business community emphasizes
catch-all phrases and the list of exemplars should be resolved in favor of “Congress’s ‘obvi-
ous and dominating general purpose’” (quoting Miller v. Amusement Enters. Inc. 394 F.2d
342, 350 (5th Cir. 1968))).
158 S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 59 (1989).
159 H.R. REP. NO. 101–485, pt. 2, at 108 (1990).
160 Under this view, the intent of individual legislators lacks relevance when interpret-
ing the statute because judges cannot know what legislators sacrificed in order to get a
large enough consensus to pass the final iteration of the statutory text.  Judges can only
know what Congress “intended” by looking at the terms of the text as they objectively exist
in the statute, not to subjective intents of individual legislators.  Stated succinctly, “it is easy
to announce intents and hard to enact laws.” Cont’l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers
& Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990).
Instead, “[w]e are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislatures. . . . ‘The law as it
passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken
is in the act itself.’”  Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845)).  Looking
outside the text that passed bicameralism and presentment means ignoring “the gamut of
the process” including “committees, fighting for time on the floor, compromise because
other members want some unrelated objective, passage, exposure to veto, and so on.”
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 59, 64 (1988).
161  NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 30–31 (2004).
162 Id. at 31 (second and third alterations in original).
163 Id. at 32.
164 Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
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both the nature and magnitude of the compromises that in all probability
took place during the ADA’s consideration to achieve such a successful bipar-
tisan result.  And, indeed, the Act is replete with such overt compromises.
For example, the Act expressly exempts over-the-road buses from installing
accessible restrooms if doing so would result in a loss of seating space.165
Subject to certain exceptions, facilities with fewer than three stories or con-
sisting of less than three thousand square feet do not need to install an eleva-
tor.166  These and copious other examples167 demonstrate the level of give-
and-take that took place during the formulation of the legislation.
Another ancillary, common objection to the use of legislative history
bears mention due to its particular relevance to this Act.  Legislation that
heavily implicates special interest groups can incentivize legislators to pepper
the legislative history with choice snippets of supportive material so as to
influence interpretations of the statute, even if those views lacked support at
the time of enactment.168  This concern applies rigorously here, since both
private business and disability rights interest groups featured prominently in
discussions surrounding the Act.169
165 42 U.S.C. § 12186(a)(2)(C) (2012).
166 Id. § 12183(b).
167 See, e.g., id. § 12187 (exempting private clubs and religious organizations); id.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (exempting businesses from modifying practices and procedures if
doing so would “fundamentally alter” the nature of the goods and services provided); id.
§ 12183(a)(1) (exempting construction of accessible buildings for first occupancy if doing
so would be “structurally impractical”).
168 See Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1612 (2012) (“The more you use legislative history,
the phonier it will become.  Downtown Washington law firms make it their business to
create legislative history; that is a regular part of their practice.  They send up statements
that can be read on the floor or statements that can be inserted into committee reports. . . .
It’s not that we use it because it’s there.  It’s there because we use it.”).
169 Three other generally applicable objections to the use of legislative history also
apply here.  First, some textualists contest the claim that House and Senate committee
reports accurately reflect aggregated congressional intent because they question the pre-
mise that individual congressmen read and rely upon the substance of the reports. See, e.g.,
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (“I am confident that only a small proportion of the Members of
Congress read either one of the Committee Reports . . . [and] that very few of those who
did read them set off for the nearest law library to check out what was actually said in . . .
the more than 50 other cases cited by the House and Senate Reports . . . .”).  Second, social
choice theory research indicates that ordering effects, such as when in the day the bill is
discussed, can influence how Congressmen vote on the bill. See, e.g., Frank H.  Easter-
brook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547–48 (1983) (noting that the ability to
control the order in which Congress decides issues gives the person in control of the
agenda the ability to manipulate ordering effects such that he can gain support for issues
which otherwise would have been voted down).  Third, even in an ideal world where all
Congressmen read and discussed every clause of every report, it remains impossible to
know the final reasons why a particular person votes for a bill or the language contained
within it.  The myriad reasons behind why people, even practiced decisionmakers, make
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In addition, continued congressional silence on the issue of Internet
coverage in the wake of two historical events undermines these intentionalist
arguments.  The first occurred in 2000, when the Subcommittee on the Con-
stitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing entitled
“The Applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act to Private Internet
Sites.”170  Committee members heard testimony from those advocating for
the inclusion of private commercial websites under the Public Accommoda-
tions Provision.171  Two years before the hearing, the Electronic and Infor-
mation Technology Access Advisory Committee proposed and passed rules
for making federal department and agency websites accessible to the dis-
abled.172  The impetus for these rules arose after Congress expressly
amended the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which requires the federal govern-
ment and other federal fund recipients to extend equal employment oppor-
tunities and facilities access to the disabled.173  The amendments expressly
added a right of equal access to electronic information technology.174  In
many ways, the Rehabilitation Act served as the precursor to the ADA.  The
two statutes fulfill similar purposes, and the ADA draws heavily upon lan-
guage from the Rehabilitation Act.175  The ADA also uses lessons learned
from experience enforcing the Rehabilitation Act to craft more aggressive
methods to eradicate discrimination.176  Yet, notwithstanding the statutes’
similar goals and the Rehab Act amendments two years earlier, the commit-
tee took no action after the hearing to follow a similar course of action for
the ADA.177
The second event took place in 2007.  After both the circuit split in
interpreting the public accommodations definition had arisen and the hear-
ing had taken place, Congress did undertake to amend the ADA significantly.
Discussion of the amendment process again illustrates the great level of com-
promise involved in this Act and the necessity for interpreting the terms as
they exist, and only as they exist, in the text of the statute.
The push to amend the Act arose after the Supreme Court decided
three cases that narrowly interpreted the Act’s definition of disability under
Title I, which prohibits disability-based employment discrimination.178  The
Court’s decisions removed many previously eligible individuals with disabili-
choices counsel against turning to legislative history in order to decipher intent, especially
in an omnibus comprehensive bill with voluminous legislative history such as the ADA.
170 Applicability of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) to Private Internet Sites: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 31–32
(2000).
171 Id.
172 See 36 C.F.R. § 1194.1 (2014).
173 See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2012).
174 See id. § 794d.
175 See Maroney, supra note 9, at 199–200.
176 See id.
177 See Moberly, supra note 64, at 964.
178 See Chai R. Feldblum et al., The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. &
C.R. 187, 192–93 (2008).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL110.txt unknown Seq: 23  8-DEC-15 17:06
2015] equal  access  in  cyberspace 469
ties from the Act’s protection and caused interpretive issues in the lower
courts.179  The National Council on Disability as well as disability rights advo-
cates and lawmakers sought to overturn the Court’s holdings, reinstate the
original definition of disability, and provide additional clarifying language to
prevent further challenges regarding what constituted a disability under the
Act.180  Some of the original drafters of the ADA partook in this process.181
These drafters “used their understanding of Congress’s original intent to cre-
ate a bill that carries ‘out the ADA’s objectives of providing “a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination” and
“clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination”
by reinstating a broad scope of protection.’”182
The bill was introduced in both houses on July 26, 2007;183 the Depart-
ment of Justice and members of the business community opposed the
amendment effort.184  Of particular note is the fact that some in the business
community expressed reservations about the “extreme breadth” of the pro-
posed amendments.185  To counteract this opposition and to maintain the
broad bipartisan support that the Act had enjoyed for the prior seventeen
years, multiple parties undertook a lengthy and detailed negotiation pro-
cess.186  Beginning in February 2008, groups from the disability rights and
business communities met frequently over thirteen weeks to propose model
language for the amendments.187  Prior to beginning negotiations, each
group signed a document promising to defend and promote the provisions
in the final “compromise language” to Congress.188  Once Congress had
received the model bill, the agreement also bound the parties not to support
any congressionally proposed changes unless all negotiators agreed to
them.189  On May 15, 2008, after—in the words of one of the negotiators—
“thirteen weeks of meetings between the disability and business negotiating
teams, endless drafting and redrafting of legislative language . . . and numer-
ous meetings and calls for internal vetting within the separate communities
179 Id. at 193.
180 See id. at 187, 194–95.
181 Id. at 187; see also EMILY A. BENFER, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT:
AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT CHANGES TO THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 2 (2009).
182  BENFER, supra note 181, at 1 (quoting ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3554 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012))).
183 See Feldblum et al., supra note 178, at 198.
184 Id. at 229.
185 Id. at 229 & n.162.
186 Id. at 229–31.
187 Id. at 229; id. at 229 n.166 (noting that the business representatives consisted of
members from the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers,
and the Society of Human Resource Management).
188 Id. at 229–30.
189 Id. at 230; see also id. at 229 n.166 (listing Chai Feldblum and Kevin Barry, two of the
article’s authors, as negotiators in the meetings).
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. . . as well as numerous meetings with the larger disability community[ ], a
final compromise was reached.”190
Though the bill passed the House,191 Senators challenged its language
and raised additional concerns in July 2008.192  This necessitated a third ver-
sion of the amendments in order to effectuate a “final compromise” between
“the key Senate offices and . . . the business and disability communities.”193
The final product, representing twelve months and three iterations of com-
promise, passed unanimously in both houses of Congress and was signed by
President George W. Bush on September 25, 2008.194  The amendments did
not discuss or amend anything relating to the public accommodations
provisions.
This lengthy amendment process exemplifies the level of elaborate com-
promise that characterizes the ADA due to its self-conscious attempt to main-
tain bipartisan support and cooperation from private businesses.  The
reaction to the amendments by the business community is also illustrative.
Given the negative pushback expressed in a context where Congress sought
only to restore the original understanding to which the parties had previously
agreed, it seems highly unlikely that raising the issue of extending public
accommodations to websites would not have engendered similar pushback,
discussion, and a need for compromise.195  Additionally, in its only attempt
to actively clarify and restore the intent of the ADA, Congress took no steps
to guarantee that places of public accommodations do, or should, cover pri-
vate, commercial websites.
C. A Look at the ADA’s Second Purpose
A final point counseling against an expansive interpretation of public
accommodations involves returning to the text of the Act and assessing the
question in light of the statute’s equally important standards purpose.  Exam-
ination of the statutory scheme reveals an extensive set of rights secured
under a coterminous set of standards.  Further, each standard utilizes a dif-
ferent set of liability rules and exemptions.  This comprehensiveness indi-
cates that Congress chose to create an enforcement scheme in which the two
purposes work in tandem: the standards serve as the vehicles through which
the Act effectuates its broad remedial purpose of eradicating disability-based
discrimination.196
190 Id. at 230.
191 Id. at 230–31.
192 Id. at 231.
193 Id. at 239.
194 Id. at 239–40.
195 See Brian Wentz et al., Retrofitting Accessibility: The Legal Inequality of After-the-Fact
Online Access for Persons with Disabilities in the United States, FIRST MONDAY (Nov. 7, 2011),
http://firstmonday.org/article/view/3666/3077 (listing nine common concerns about
making technology accessible, including cost increases, development time, niche markets,
aesthetics, and the possibility that the needs of every disability will never be met).
196 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2012).
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Section 12182 begins the Title with a broad prohibition against discrimi-
nation in places of public accommodation.197  The remainder of the section
contains eighteen separate prohibitions, or standards, against discrimination
in a host of more targeted areas including physical access, eligibility require-
ments, and participation in activities.198  These standards differ depending
on the behavior being targeted.  For instance, an entity must reasonably mod-
ify policies to make goods and services available to the disabled unless doing
so would “fundamentally alter the nature of such goods.”199  In contrast, the
Act obligates the same entity to remove all architectural barriers wherever
readily achievable200 and, if unable to do so, to provide goods and services
through alternative means wherever readily achievable.201
Sections 12183 and 12184 together enact nine additional standards spe-
cifically identifying conduct constituting discriminatory barriers to physical
access.  Section 12183 provides two sets of standards by which the construc-
tion or alteration of new facilities will be measured,202 while Section 12184
provides seven sets of standards that govern certain privately provided trans-
portation services.203  Here, too, the liability rules differ and are subject to
varying exemptions, depending on the conduct being targeted.204
These twenty-seven definitions of discriminatory conduct, contained
within just one of the Act’s titles, exemplify the breadth and level of detail
provided in the statute concerning the rights it secures.  In keeping with its
task of providing a clear and comprehensive mandate, the Act does not
merely prohibit discrimination globally and broadly delegate authority to an
executive agency to define the contours of what constitutes discrimination.
Instead, the Act creates a detailed set of rules that—on the face of the statute
alone—give notice to both disabled individuals and affected businesses
regarding their rights and responsibilities as well as the standards of review
courts must utilize when assessing compliance.205  This enforcement scheme
additionally benefits the disabled individual by triggering governmental
action to promulgate accompanying regulations.206  Should this not occur,
the statute’s text still enables a disabled individual to connect any infringe-
ment to at least one of the many standards contained within the Act, thereby
197 Id. § 12182(a).
198 Id. § 12182(b).
199 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
200 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
201 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v).
202 Id. §§ 12183(a)(1)–(a)(2).
203 Id. §§ 12184(b)(1)–(b)(7).
204 Compare id. § 12184(6) (making it per se unlawful to lease new inaccessible railway
cars, subjected to no exemption), with id. § 12184(7) (prohibiting the use of remanufac-
tured railway cars unless the company can show that they have made the cars accessible “to
the maximum extent feasible”).
205 See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (“[I]t is reasonable that a fair
warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will under-
stand . . . . To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.”).
206 See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b).
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eliminating any ambiguity as to whether discrimination has or has not taken
place.  Should the DOJ lag behind in its responsibility to pass regulations,
then, a disabled plaintiff retains the ability to vindicate his rights in a private
cause of action.
This analysis lends credence to the Access Now court’s admonition that
“[w]here Congress has created specifically enumerated rights and expressed
the intent of setting forth ‘clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards,’”
courts should not expand those rights, lest they “create new rights without
well-defined standards.”207  Any disparity between the Act’s goal of com-
pletely eradicating discrimination and the areas reached by the Act’s stan-
dards should be resolved by including standards covering those situations
expressly, along with respective liability rules and exemptions.  To do other-
wise undercuts the very enforcement scheme that Congress chose to utilize to
address the needs of the disabled and carry out the purposes of the Act.
III. THE PROPER SOLUTION
The above discussion identifies a discrepancy between the trend in the
current case law toward inclusion of websites as public accommodations and
the text of the statute which does not permit such a reading.  This Part
advances four arguments for why disability rights advocates should pressure
Congress for express amendments establishing a right of access to websites
and other emerging technologies, even if they agree with the DOJ’s current
interpretation.
First, though the current legal trend and an express amendment might
lead to similarly favorable results for the disabled, a statutory edict will
remove the interpretive discretion currently enjoyed by judges and the DOJ.
Thus, the amendment approach will increase the likelihood that a public
policy favoring access to websites will remain in place over time.  Returning
to Singer’s public accommodation timeline elucidates the wisdom of the stat-
utory method.  As Singer describes, pro-segregationists used the favored con-
temporary public policy goals of laissez-faire economics and the freedom of
contract to ensconce the right to exclude as sacrosanct.208  After narrowing
the duty of access to only inns and common carriers, segregationists argued
successfully that racial segregation into separate, allegedly equal accommoda-
tions in these enterprises constituted a “reasonable regulation” of these busi-
nesses.209  Because the duty to serve arose from an implied common law
duty, statutes often did not expressly codify it or referred only vaguely to
207 Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
208 Singer, supra note 137, at 1395 (inferring that the discrepancy between a school of
economics that favored freedom from regulation in general and Jim Crow laws that
imposed substantial regulatory burdens on businesses to perpetuate segregation shows that
racial politics, not true adherence to laissez-faire economics, was the motivating factor
behind this narrowing); see also id. at 1300 (arguing that this racially-motivated narrowing
might have helped to replace the system built upon implied duties with a more fully devel-
oped laissez-faire conception).
209 Id. at 1298.
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“public accommodations,” giving segregationists the ability to re-interpret
these terms more narrowly.210
This historical lens sheds light on the need to reduce judicial and
prosecutorial discretion in the ADA context.  As with post-Reconstruction
public accommodation law, the current, policy-oriented approach to the
ADA allows judges to read the public accommodation duty as narrowly or as
expansively as they please.  It also leaves room for businesses to try to evade
or cabin their alleged responsibilities under the Act.  This concern is of par-
ticular note given the Supreme Court’s historic penchant for construing the
ADA exceedingly narrowly in other contexts, even when the Act’s compre-
hensive standards spoke directly to the issue.211  Enacting express statutory
amendments will help alleviate this problem by forcing the judiciary to
acknowledge that the ADA includes websites when applying and interpreting
the law.
Similar problems arise from the interpretive discretion currently enjoyed
by the Department of Justice.  Though the Department has recently enforced
the ADA as though it covers websites,212 nothing in the Act as it stands obli-
gates the DOJ to continue doing so.  The statute provides no guarantee to
the disabled community that the Attorney General for the next presidential
administration will pass regulations consistent with a public policy upholding
a right of access to electronic information.  Similarly, the Act also obligates
the Attorney General to investigate “alleged violations” under the Act.213
Though the DOJ will always possess prosecutorial discretion, the current stat-
ute does not clearly define and outline what constitutes a violation of a right
of access to a website; an Attorney General choosing to read the statute
according to its text can skirt his prosecutorial duty completely by simply
announcing that violations of that sort do not fall under the provisions of
Title III.  Enacting amendments would remove the choice of a narrow inter-
pretation from the Attorney General’s hands, thus facilitating consistency in
interpretation and enforcement rather than leaving the rights of the disabled
subject to the vagaries of the political appointments process.  Further, an
amendment would force the DOJ to promulgate rules accompanying these
textual provisions.214
Second, compared with a policy-oriented approach, a statutory mandate
increases the likelihood of ex ante, prospective compliance by businesses
rather than ex post attempts to “retrofit[ ] accessibility.”215  For instance,
Netflix, rather than building its site from the ground up according to univer-
210 Id.
211 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 161, at 44–99.
212 See supra notes 16–17.
213 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
214 See id. § 12186(b) (stating that the DOJ must pass accompanying regulations within
one year).
215 See generally Wentz et al., supra note 195 (analogizing after-the-fact retrofitting of
technology to the same issues experienced by the disabled in making pre-existing educa-
tional and transportation facilities accessible).
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sal standards compelled by statutory mandate, instead agreed to retrofit its
website only after litigation arose.  This approach flies in the face of the ADA,
which mandates immediate, universal access to places of public accommoda-
tion.216  Instead, retrofitting results in a “glaring form of inequality” for the
disabled during the gap between the release of an inaccessible product and
the formulation and launch of an accessible version.217
Third, a lack of clear standards also negatively impacts businesses subject
to the ADA’s provisions by providing them with inadequate notice of their
legal responsibilities.  To continue with the Netflix example, the business has
incurred the costs of two lawsuits as well as the cost of retrofitting its software
within the timeframe specified by the consent decree.  Opponents might
argue that the business community could mitigate these costs by simply
applying universal access principles such as the W3C standards.  Though this
might be true, it does not answer the wholly separate question regarding the
fairness of holding a private business liable for not complying with a set of
voluntary “recommendations”218 subject to change at any time in order to
comply with an as-of-yet-unsubstantiated legal duty.219  Further, in a world of
rapidly changing technology, yesterday’s universal access might easily
become today’s accessibility barrier.  The stipulation in the Peapod/DOJ set-
tlement agreement that either party may seek review of the agreement
should it conflict with future DOJ regulations seems to indicate that the DOJ
recognizes this fact.220  Without clearly delineated standards and obligations,
a business has no way of ensuring that its content, despite its best efforts,
remains accessible as technology continues to develop and grow more
intricate.
Fourth, a statutory approach will help secure global rights for the dis-
abled instead of the patchwork of tentatively protected rights reached
through individual enforcement actions and adjudications.  This is primarily
because each individual action targets only the accessibility barriers faced by
a subset of the disabled community.  Such an approach means that the con-
text of the lawsuit will dictate which subgroups of the broader disabled com-
munity will enjoy the benefits of successful litigation.  Comparing the Netflix
consent decree with those of Peapod and H&R Block illustrates this tension.
The Netflix decree did not mention W3C guidelines at all, since the chal-
216 See 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (providing guidelines both for constructing new places of
public accommodations as well as how to alter those which existed at the time of the Act’s
passage).
217 See Wentz et al., supra note 195.
218 See Caldwell et al., supra note 15 (describing the guidelines as covering “a wide
range of recommendations for making Web content more accessible”).
219 Aside from which regulations to be used, for example, the DOJ notice of proposed
rulemaking also seeks comment on whether an “incremental” approach to regulation
should be used, such as applying the regulations first to businesses with a certain number
of employees or which generate a certain amount of revenue. See Gardella, supra note 111
(noting also that beyond businesses providing products or services to the public through
their website, the reach of the proposed rule is “not yet clear”).
220 See Peapod Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 12(f).
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lenged conduct only concerned video closed captioning.  The decree
imposed a correspondingly narrow training obligation on Netflix; it required
Netflix to train its employees only on issues related to closed captioning, as
opposed to all accessibility concerns.221  In contrast, the H&R Block and
Peapod agreements do incorporate the broader accessibility protection
afforded by the W3C guidelines by requiring the companies to adhere to the
standards published on December 11, 2008.222  However, this means that
should the WAI undertake to update the standards, H&R Block and Peapod
might once again become inaccessible while still complying with the terms of
their agreements.223
The possibility for future W3C standards to nullify the settlement agree-
ments is especially troubling in light of the fact that the Web Accessibility
Initiative has created a task force to rectify current forms of “cognitive” web
accessibility affecting those with intellectual and learning disabilities, autism,
and other conditions.224  If the WAI develops standards addressing these
concerns, H&R Block and Peapod will not be legally bound to incorporate
them under the consent decrees.  The creation of the Task Force also dem-
onstrates that the W3C guidelines, as currently written, do not adequately
address the accessibility concerns of all disabled individuals.  This makes the
DOJ’s treatment of the W3C standards as the watermark of compliance prob-
lematic when juxtaposed against the ADA’s aims of fully eradicating all forms
of discrimination faced by all people with disabilities.  Therefore, though
those with hearing, visual, and mobility disabilities have achieved varying
degrees of success under each of the three respective settlement agreements,
they have done so at the expense of those with other types of disabilities
equally protected under the ADA.
Enforcement actions additionally work to the detriment of the disabled
community because each decree limits access rights to the specific business
in question.  The access rights of the blind to providers of online grocery
stores has not been globally secured through the Peapod agreement, nor
221 See Netflix Consent Decree, supra note 95, § 6.
222 See H&R Block Consent Decree, supra note 17, §§ 12(a)–12(b); Peapod Settlement
Agreement, supra note 17, § 12(b).
223 The accessibility testing groups provided for in the H&R Block and Peapod agree-
ments serve as another example of how enforcement actions secure specific rather than
global rights.  Both companies agreed to submit future web content to accessibility testing
groups comprised only of persons with a finite set of disabilities. See H&R Block Consent
Decree, supra note 17, § 21 (stipulating that “changes shall be tested by individuals with
different disabilities, including at a minimum individuals who are blind, deaf, and/or have
physical disabilities affecting manual dexterity”); Peapod Settlement Agreement, supra
note 17, § 19.
224 The Cognitive Accessibility Task Force webpage is a wiki-page in which various con-
tributors collaboratively express ideas and recommend alterations to the W3C guidelines.
Gap Analysis, W3C COGNITIVE ACCESSIBILITY TASK FORCE (Sept. 6, 2015), https://
www.w3.org/WAI/PF/cognitive-a11y-tf/wiki/Gap_Analysis#Section_1:_Abstract_and_Intro
duction.  The Task Force is currently investigating accessibility gaps for those with autism,
ADHD, aphasia, dementia, Down Syndrome, and others.
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have the access rights of the hearing impaired to material provided through
other major online streaming video libraries such as Amazon Prime and
iTunes.  Though other companies may choose to voluntarily adopt analogous
procedures to those set out in the agreements, they do so at their discretion
and, in following the procedures, potentially exclude some disabled individu-
als from their accessibility considerations.  In this regard, too, the consent
decrees provide weaker protections to the overall disabled community when
compared with imposing clear statutory standards and obligations on all cov-
ered businesses.
Taken together, this discussion elucidates the need for explicit amend-
ments to the ADA to bring not only websites but also all emerging technolo-
gies within its scope.  Proponents might argue that the regulatory process will
resolve these issues.  Regulations promulgated by the Attorney General will
create these necessary guidelines, giving plaintiffs the legal clout they need
and businesses the warnings they deserve.
This argument overlooks both the magnitude of the underlying problem
as well as the nature of the regulatory process.  In 2015, a principal issue
facing the disabled lies in accessibility to websites.  However, this will not
always remain the case.  As technology continues to change, one can imagine
a world in which some other infrastructural medium utterly supersedes the
Internet.  Where will the disabled be left then?  The answer is right back
where they started—waiting and lobbying for the government to place
another retrofitting, piecemeal regulatory bandage over the newest and latest
technological accessibility barrier.  Relying on forced readings of the statute
and the regulatory process will continually present the task of ascertaining
whether or not a new form of technology does or does not fall under the
auspices of the ADA.  Even if it arguably does, the disabled will still remain at
the beneficence of the Attorney General who could take, as he has here, six
years to “consider,” let alone pass, regulations.225  There is an inherent
inconsistency between a statute aiming to secure universal access for disabled
individuals to the goods and services offered to the general public and an
implementation interpretation forcing the same individuals to wait years for
that access while the regulatory process unfolds.
Herein lies the need for express amendments that, to the greatest extent
possible, would specifically ensconce the rights of the disabled statutorily
rather than broadly delegating the authority to an administrative agency to
define those rights.  Unlike regulations, such amendments would not simply
address websites or mobile applications, but any and all emerging technology
associated with e-commerce.  Such standards would incorporate the needs of
the business community and would ideally dispel any erroneous myths about
the difficulty of making technology accessible.  The guidelines would outline
universal requirements for personnel training on accessibility, and give busi-
nesses direction on how to ensure that their products are accessible.  The
amendments could lay out a process for evaluating future technology similar
225 See supra note 108.
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to the one outlined in the Act used for assessing physical structures.  This
would ensure that the disabled have access to technology from the very
moment it enters the market.  Perhaps most important, these standards
could recognize the need for prompt action in a rapidly changing technolog-
ical age by holding relevant governmental agencies accountable when they
fail to act promptly in the face of changed circumstances.  In sum, these stan-
dards would put an end to the piecemeal approach by which the disabled
have heretofore taken two steps forward and one step back by creating broad,
globally applicable principles that will exert beneficial influence over the
development of future case law and regulations.
CONCLUSION
This Note has sought to answer the question whether the Public Accom-
modations Provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act covers private,
commercial websites wholly divorced from brick-and-mortar structures.  In
doing so, it has identified a discrepancy between the case law, which has
moved toward an interpretation favoring inclusion, and the text of the stat-
ute, which does not support this reading.  The developments in the case law
thus far have culminated in the piecemeal procurement of rights of access to
some commercial websites; however, the positive effects of these successes
have been enjoyed disproportionately by those with some disabilities at the
expense of individuals with other types of disabilities.  Meanwhile, accessibil-
ity barriers continue to exist across the Internet in a variety of forms and in a
host of contexts.
The current enforcement of the Public Accommodations Provision
undermines the ADA’s goal of eradicating all forms of disability-based dis-
crimination faced by individuals living with all types of disabling conditions.
The solution to this problem lies not in continuing to read the statute
broadly in order to sweep more and more entities under its umbrella, but in
expressly amending the statute to set out “clear, strong, consistent, enforcea-
ble standards”226 which secure the right of access for websites and all other
emerging e-commerce technologies.  Such an approach is in keeping with
the ADA’s goal of universal, immediate access to new structures, takes
account of the uniquely different characteristics of technology compared to
physical structures, and does not force the disabled to wait for access between
the emergence of new technologies and the commencement and conclusion
of the regulatory process.
226 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2012).
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